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LEGAL MODELS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATION OF EXCHANGE RATES 
Joseph Gold* 
INTRODUCTION 
No legal scholar has contributed more to the study of the harmonization 
of national interests by international agreement than Professor Eric Stein. 
This essay in his honor examines some of the efforts that have been made 
since the Bretton Woods Conference of July 1944 to bring order into the 
important international relationships that are called exchange rates. The 
subject has a further pertinence because of Eric Stein's work on the Euro-
pean Community. The law of the Community on exchange rates has been 
affected by the fortunes of the law of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). The Treaty of Rome relied to a large extent on the legal order es-
tablished originally by the IMF's Articles of Agreement, but the Commu-
nity has attempted to create its own system as the wider order of the IMF 
has come under the pressure of troublesome economic developments. Here 
is another aspect of harmonization: the law of the European collectivity 
must fit into the law of the broader society of nations. Finally, the subject is 
timely because the behavior of exchange rates is a constant preoccupation 
of monetary authorities and scholars and provokes them to call for im-
provements in international monetary arrangements. 
National and International Interests 
The exchange rate for a country's currency is one of the most important 
prices in the national economy, and often the most important price, but the 
exchange rate is also a price in the international economy. The exchange 
rate between the currencies of two countries is a relationship between the 
currencies and between the economies of the two countries. "In an open 
trade and payments system exchange rates are bound to lie at the center of 
economic relations between sovereign states."1 This fact suggests that ex-
change rates should be subject to international agreement in some form if 
disorder is to be avoided in economic relations among states. 
Nevertheless, the traditional view could be expressed by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice in 1929 in the simple assertion that "[i]t is 
indeed a generally accepted principle that a State is entitled to regulate its 
own currency."2 The Bretton Woods Conference, in producing the Articles 
of Agreement of the IMF, revolutionized international monetary law and 
international economic relations. Lord Keynes, one of the leaders in this 
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1. GROUP OF THIRTY, THE PROBLEMS OF EXCHANGE RATES 10 (1982). 
2. Case of Serbian Loans, 1929 P.C.I.J., ser. A, Nos. 20/21, at 44. 
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revolution, wrote about the necessity for change in a letter dated May 29, 
1945 to Edward M. Bernstein of the U.S. Treasury: 
Pigou has just called my attention to a passage in Marshall's Evidence 
before the Gold and Silver Commission-Q. 10,006, more than fifty years 
ago (have we yet asked more than 10,000 questions about Bretton Woods?) 
as follows:-
! think that there is a real, though very slow-moving, tendency for national interests to 
overrule provincial interests, and international interests to overrule national, and I think 
the time will come at which it will be thought as unreasonable for any country to regulate 
its currency without reference to other countries as it would be to have signalling codes at 
sea which took no account of the signalling codes at sea of other countries. 
So once more we may hope the old man has been right, with not much 
more of a time-lag than it is reasonable to expect, at least in international 
affairs.3 
The participants in the Bretton Woods Conference accepted the princi-
ple that because exchange rates were matters of international concern, they 
should be subject to international consultation and agreement. A major 
argument to support this radical change was that the pooling of authority 
by all countries would protect the agreed exchange rate of each country's 
currency from unfair competition by other countries when establishing the 
exchange rates for their currencies.4 
International monetary conditions have become turbulent in recent 
years. Great changes have occurred in the law governing exchange rates, 
and, as noted earlier, proposals have been made for further developments. 
It is useful, therefore, to attempt to isolate some essential characteristics of 
various models that have been employed, or have been recommended, for 
the regulation of exchange rates by procedures not solely dependent on the 
exercise of discretion by the issuer of the currency. 
Procedures that are not confined to the exercise of discretion of the is-
suer imply a role for an entity external to the issuer. Some of the main 
elements to be discussed in the models that involve such an entity are: 
(i) the fixed or floating character of the exchange rate for a currency; 
(ii) the initiative that can be taken to establish the exchange rate; 
(iii) the external entity authorized to react to the exchange rate; 
(iv) the stage at which the external entity reacts; 
(v) the majority for the decision of the external entity by which it reacts. 
Former Par Value System of IMF 
The original Articles of the IMF, which became effective on December 
27, 1945, established a par value system5 that distributed legal authority in 
3. THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, VOLUME XXVI, ACTIVITIES 
1941-1946: SHAPING THE POST-WAR WORLD, BRETTON WOODS, AND REPARATIONS 195 (0. 
Moggridge ed. 1980). 
4. 3 J. HoRSEFIELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945-1965, at 65-66 (1969) 
[hereinafter cited as 3 J. HORSEFIELD]. 
5. For a detailed discussion and references, see Gold, Developments in the International 
Monetary System, the International Monetary Fund, and International Monetary Law Since 
1971, 174 ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, RECUEIL DES CouRS 107 (1982) [hereinafter 
cited as i}evelopments in the International Monetary System]; Gold, Legal Structure of Par 
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relation to the exchange rate of a member's currency between the IMF and 
the member. Each member had to reach agreement with the IMF on an 
initial par value for the member's currency in terms of gold as the common 
denominator of the system.6 The IMF would deem an initial par value 
suitable if it could be sustained without the need for undue financial sup-
port by the IMF. 
The objective of the par value system was the stability of exchange rates, 
while avoiding rigidity. To provide elasticity, the Articles permitted 
changes in par values. A member could propose a change in the par value 
of its currency, but, to promote stability, the member's privilege was formu-
lated negatively, and the test to be met by a proposal was severe: "A mem-
ber shall not propose a change in the par value of its currency except to 
correct a fundamental disequilibrium."7 A proposal was not justified if it 
was intended to deal with a transitory problem. The IMF's pool of re-
sources could be drawn on to enable a member to ride out such a problem 
without a change of par value. 
A proposed change, which had to be to another fixed value, had to be 
sufficient to correct the fundamental disequilibrium. A proposed devalua-
tion was objectionable ifit was excessive, because it would be unfairly com-
petitive with other members. A proposed revaluation was objectionable if 
it was inadequate, because it would excite the prospect of further changes 
and encourage speculation, which would lead to unstable exchange rates. 
A member had to consult the IMF before making any change of par 
value. The concurrence of the IMF was necessary, except in some situa-
tions of minor importance. If the IMF was satisfied that a proposal met the 
test for changes, the IMF had to concur in the proposal. The IMF could 
not object if, for example, it would have preferred the member to follow 
deflationary policies and avoid a change of par value. 
Each member had to adopt measures consistent with the Articles that 
would make the par value for the member's currency effective in exchange 
transactions within its territories. The measures had to ensure that transac-
tions for the exchange of the member's currency and another member's cur-
rency were conducted at exchange rates that did not go beyond narrow 
limits as defined by the Articles. These limits were above and below the 
relationship (the parity) between the two currencies that was derived from 
their par values. The measure chosen by the U.S. to perform its obligation 
to maintain the par value of the dollar was the readiness of the U.S. to buy 
and sell gold for dollars with the monetary authorities of other members at 
prices based on the par value. The measure chosen by other members was 
their readiness, whenever necessary, to intervene in the exchange markets 
by buying and selling dollars (or another currency convertible into dollars) 
for their own currency. The rates of exchange in these transactions had to 
Value System Before Second Amendment, in LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: SELECTED EsSAYS 520 (1979). 
6. The par value could be fixed in relation to the U.S. dollar of the gold value as of July I, 
1944, but the effect was simply to fix the par value indirectly in terms of gold. 
7. Article IV, Section 5(a), Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 
opened for signature July 22, 1944, 20 U.S.T. 2755, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39. 
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be kept within the defined limits around the parity between their currency 
and the dollar and the other intervention currency of their choice. 
The IMF was not empowered to authorize a member to adopt a floating 
exchange rate for its currency instead of maintaining an effective par 
value. 8 A rate floated when the exchange rates in transactions were not 
kept within the defined limits around parities. The fundamental assump-
tion of the par value system was that fixed rates produced better economic 
results than floating rates. In addition, governments had concluded that 
fixed rates could be maintained without unacceptable difficulties and that 
international control could be exercised more effectively over fixed rates. 
Another principle of the Articles was that a member should have a uni-
tary exchange rate for its currency. A member should not have different 
rates for different transactions (multiple currency practices) or exchange 
rates for its currency that were not consistent with all the parities between 
its currency and other currencies and therefore were necessarily less 
favorable for some as compared with other currencies (discriminatory cur-
rency arrangements). These two categories of exchange measures were pro-
hibited because they harmed the member that imposed them or other 
members. The IMF was authorized, nevertheless, to permit a member to 
depart from a unitary exchange rate for its currency. If the IMF approved a 
member's request to impose a multiple currency practice, the reason nor-
mally was that the member could not readily institute other, and possibly 
nonmonetary, measures with equivalent effect when dealing with an ex-
change emergency. The IMF would approve the practice for a limited pe-
riod only. The IMF became increasingly reluctant to approve 
discriminatory currency arrangements. 
The objective of the original Articles can be summarized as the mainte-
nance of fixed, unitary, and nondiscriminatory exchange rates that carried 
the endorsement of the international community as expressed in decisions 
of the IMF. Multiple currency practices and discriminatory currency ar-
rangements were interferences with the pattern of exchange rates that 
would result from the full realization of the objective of the par value sys-
tem. The prohibition of these measures, and the IMF's authority to ap-
prove derogations, are preserved by the present Articles notwithstanding 
the disappearance of the par value systems. The economic reasons for con-
tinuing to prefer rates that are unitary and nondiscriminatory, even though 
they are not fixed or endorsed as they were in the days of the par value 
system, are similar to those of the past. 
When the original Articles were being negotiated, the United States fa-
vored a transfer to the IMF of greater authority over exchange rates than 
8. Under the original Articles, the IMF had authority, in the event of an emergency or the 
development of unforeseen circumstances threatening the operations of the IMF, to suspend 
the provisions on the limits around parities that had to be observed in exchange transactions. 
The authority was conferred on the IMF because of the unprecedented character of the par 
value obligations. A unanimous vote of the Executive Directors was required for a suspension 
up to 120 days and an 80 per cent majority of total voting power in the Board of Governors for 
an additional period not exceeding 240 days. Par values were not abrogated by a suspension, 
but suspension validated floating for the time being. For this reason, a decision to suspend was 
not considered after August 15, 1971, because it was assumed that some members would not 
agree to validate the action taken by the United States on that date. 
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the United Kingdom was willing to concede. The United Kingdom suc-
ceeded in negotiating acceptance of the principle that a member would re-
tain ultimate authority over the exchange rate for its currency if an 
irreconcilable difference with the IMF about a change were to arise. If the 
IMF objected to a change of par value as proposed by a member, but the 
member nevertheless put the change into effect, the unauthorized change 
would not be deemed to be a violation of the Articles. The member was 
shielded against the odium of violation, even though the member was auto-
matically denied the use of the IMF's resources in support of the new par 
value and even though ineligibility to use the resources was also the penalty 
for a violation. If t~e difference of opinion persisted beyond a reasonable 
period, the IMF could compel the member to withdraw from the organiza-
tion. The power to compel withdrawal demonstrated how central was the 
international acceptability of exchange rates in the compact among mem-
bers represented by the Articles. 
The decisions of the IMF in the exercise of its authority over exchange 
rates were taken with a majority of the votes cast in the Executive Board. 
Each Executive Director could cast, as a unit, the number of votes allocated 
to the member that appointed him, or to the group of members that elected 
him, according to the formula for weighted voting power in the Articles. 
The existence of a simple majority of the votes cast was determined on any 
occasion without reference to the votes of Executive Directors who ab-
stained in the voting. It was conceivable, therefore, that a decision might be 
taken by a proportion of voting power that was less than a majority of the 
total voting power of all members. These provisions on voting have not 
been amended when a simple majority suffices. 
It is remarkable that countries, in moving from the uncontrolled na-
tional determination of exchange rates to international regulation, accepted 
the exercise of international authority by decisions taken with so small a 
proportion of total voting power.9 This development was not less remark-
able because a member was entitled to have its votes cast even when a deci-
sion related to its own currency. No member could carry or veto these 
decisions by the exercise of its own voting power. 
The negotiators of the original Articles required high majorities of total 
voting power for only a few categories of decisions on exchange rates or 
other matters. The United States may have refrained from negotiating a 
broad veto for itself because of the enormous strength of its economy and 
currency and the influence it expected to have as a result. Led by the 
United States, the negotiators held the view that the business of the IMF 
should be conducted expeditiously. A simple majority of the votes cast was 
more likely to promote the dispatch of business. This majority would pre-
vent obstruction by a dissident minority, because Executive Directors who 
sat on the fence by abstaining would not be able to obstruct those who 
stood erect and were counted. Once a proposal involving an exchange rate 
9. Gold, The Origins of Weighted Voting Power in the Fund, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT, 
Mar. 1981, at 25. The Plan for a Stabilization Fund prepared by H.D. White of the U.S. 
Treasury proposed, in versions of April 1942 and July 19, 1943, that, in the interest of stability, 
changes in exchange rates should be permitted only by decisions of the Fund adopted with a 
high majority of the total voting power. See 3 J. HoRSEFIELD, supra note 3, at 60, 89. 
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was on the agenda of the Executive Board, delay in taking a decision be-
cause a special majority had to be marshalled could be particularly harm-
ful. Knowledge of the proposal while still unresolved might become public 
and provoke destabilizing speculation. 
In the par value system of the original Articles, the five variable ele-
ments in the models discussed in this article were treated as follows: 
(i) A member had to establish a par value for its currency in terms of 
gold as the common denominator of the system, which meant that the 
member established exchange rates for its currency that were fixed within 
narrow margins above and below parities. 
(ii) A member had the power of initiative to propose the par value for its 
currency. 
(iii) The IMF was required to concur in or object to the member's pro-
posed choice of par value. 
(iv) A member had to seek the reaction of the IMF before establishing a 
par value. 
(v) The IMF reacted by means of decisions taken with a majority of the 
votes cast in the Executive Board. 
Possible Future Par Value System of IMF 
After the collapse of the original par value system, the Articles of the 
IMF were rewritten by the Second Amendment, which became effective on 
April 1, 1978, and is still in force. The present Articles contain provisions 
on a revised par value system 10 that can be brought into operation by a 
decision of the Executive Board taken with a majority of eighty-five percent 
of the total voting power. The conditions in which the decision could be 
taken are specified in the Articles. 11 The provisions that would regulate the 
revised system, if it were called into being, draw on the original Articles but 
have been modified to avoid the rigidity that became a feature of the former 
par value system and to take account of other lessons of experience. As a 
result of this approach, there are important legal differences between the 
two systems.12 
Three of the chief differences involve the common denominator, float-
ing exchange rates, and the majorities for decisions. The common denomi-
nator of the revised system would be selected by the IMF, but the choice of 
gold or a currency is prohibited, because experience has shown that they 
would not function efficiently. It is assumed, but not required, that the 
common denominator would be the SDR, the monetary reserve asset cre-
ated by the First Amendment, which took effect on July 28, 1969. The 
negotiators did not prescribe the SDR because of some apprehension that 
the IMF's method of valuing it might not be wholly satisfactory for the par 
value system. If, however, the majority existed for calling the par value 
IO. Schedule C, Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund, entered into farce Apr. 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937. 
1 I. Article IV, Section 4, Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, entered into force Apr. I, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937. 
12. For a detailed examination of the differences, see JJevelopments in the International 
Monetary System, supra note 5, at 245-62. 
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system into existence, it is unlikely that a majority could not be found for 
ensuring that a satisfactory method of valuing the SDR was in place. 
A member would not be bound to establish a par value for its currency 
and would not have to give a reason for its decision to refrain. Nor would 
the member have special obligations because of this decision. Members 
would have greater freedom, therefore, than was foreseen by the Outline ef 
Reform presented to the Board of Governors on June 4, 1974 by its Com-
mittee on Reform of the International Monetary System and Related Issues 
(Committee of 20 or C-20). The Outline assumed that at some time a sys-
tem of "stable but adjustable par values" would be instituted without pre-
cluding floating rates "in particular situations, subject to Fund 
authorization, surveillance, and review." The language was deliberately 
vague, so that the IMF would have been able to define "particular situa-
tions." Furthermore, authorization would have been given only "on condi-
tion that the country undertakes to conform with agreed guidelines for 
conduct."13 
If a member proposed a par value under the revised system of the Arti-
cles, but the IMF decided to object by a majority of the votes cast, the par 
value would not take effect for the purposes of the Articles. If the IMF did 
not object and the par value became effective in this way, the member 
would have to ensure that the rates in exchange transactions within its terri-
tories did not go beyond defined limits around parities. To permit greater 
flexibility, these limits could be, and probably would be, broader than those 
of the original Articles. 
Under the original par value system, a member could propose a change 
in the par value of its currency only to correct a fundamental disequilib-
rium. The purpose of this language also was to promote stability, but it 
seemed to suggest that a member could not move to change a par value 
before falling into the abyss of deep disequilibrium. The revised system 
would permit a member to propose a change either to correct a fundamen-
tal disequilibrium that had developed or to prevent one from developing. 
In either circumstance, the change could be made only on the proposal 
of the member, after consultation with the IMF, and with its concurrence. 
If the IMF objected, the change would not become effective for the pur-
poses of the Articles. If the member instituted the change notwithstanding 
the objection of the IMF, not only would the par value be ineffective for the 
IMF but in addition the member would be in violation of the Articles. The 
concept of the unauthorized change as undesirable but not a violation has 
disappeared. The Articles instruct the IMF to discourage the maintenance 
of an unrealistic par value. This instruction would have to be reconciled 
somehow with the absence of authority for the IMF to propose the change 
that should be made. The Managing Director would not be prevented from 
suggesting privately the par value that he would support as realistic if the 
member were to propose it. 
The original Articles did not permit a member to jettison the anchor of 
a par value. The revised system would allow a member to give notice that it 
13. COMMITTEE ON REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM AND RELATED 
ISSUES, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM: DOCUMENTS OF THE COMMITTEE OF TWENTY 
11-12 (1974). 
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intended to terminate a par value without establishing a new one, but the 
IMF could object to this action by a decision taken with eighty-five percent 
of the total voting power. The IMF would not be required to decide that it 
concurred if it did not object. If the member terminated the par value 
notwithstanding the objection of the IMF, the member would be in viola-
tion of the Articles. The par value, however, would cease to exist for the 
purposes of the Articles. 
Under the original Articles, if a currency was floating, the IMF could 
not recognize the disappearance of the par value as a legal fact. The pur-
pose of the legal fiction that the par value still existed was to put pressure on 
members not to abandon par values, but the IMF's assertion that a par 
value persisted in law after it had disappeared in fact seemed bizarre when 
inquiries were made about the legal status of the currency. To avoid this 
situation, the Second Amendment is emphatic in declaring that in certain 
circumstances a par value would cease to exist for the purposes of the Arti-
cles. Under the revised par value system, a member might forbear from 
giving notice that it was terminating a par value even though few or no 
exchange transactions involving the currency were conducted at exchange 
rates based on parities with other currencies. In the interest once again of 
realism, the IMF would have the authority in these circumstances to find 
that the par value had ceased to exist for the purposes of the Articles. If the 
par value of a member's currency was terminated by the member or ceased 
to exist under a decision of the IMF, the member would not be prevented 
from establishing a par value at a later date. 
For most of the decisions on exchange rates, a majority of the votes cast 
would suffice. This majority has been retained for the reasons that justified 
it under the original Articles. The majority of eighty-five percent of total 
voting power would be required, however, for decisions to call the revised 
par value system into operation or to object to an intended termination of a 
par value. The explanation of the requirement of this high majority, and of 
some other features of the revised system, is the position taken by the 
United States in the negotiation of the Second Amendment. The United 
States had concluded that the former par value system had given the United 
States less freedom to manage the exchange rate for its currency than had 
been available to other members. They had established exchange rates for 
their currencies in relation to the U.S. dollar as the currency of the most 
powerful economy. In effect, therefore, other members had determined ex-
change rates for the dollar. The United States believed that if it had taken 
an initiative to change the par value of the dollar, other members would 
have made corresponding changes that would have cancelled the benefit 
that the United States was seeking. 
In the drafting of the Second Amendment, the United States wanted to 
be assured that it would not be locked once again into its former predica-
ment if the revised par value system began to operate. Under the present 
Articles, therefore, the United States would be entitled to refrain from es-
tablishing an initial par value, although it is difficult to imagine that the 
United States would make this choice after voting in favor of calling the 
revised par value system into being. Moreover, the United States would be 
able to terminate a par value for the dollar, in effect at will, because the 
voting power of the United States would enable it, without the support of 
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any other member, to veto a proposed decision of the IMF to object to the 
termination. 
The requirement of the majority of eighty-five percent for some deci-
sions on exchange rates can be understood to reflect a wider distribution of 
economic and financial power in the world than existed at the time of the 
Bretton Woods Conference. The implication of the special majority is that 
the United States cannot assume that its view will predominate because of 
its role in the world. 
The main elements in the revised par value system have been arranged 
as follows: 
(i) Par values for currencies would be fixed in terms of a common de-
nominator, which would produce exchange rates fixed within prescribed 
margins around the parities with other currencies that had par values, but 
the floating of a currency could be valid. 
(ii) A member could decide not to establish an initial par value; the mem-
ber could take the initiative at any time to propose a par value or the termi-
nation of an existing par value (i.e., without proposing a change to a new 
par value). 
(iii) The IMF would be required to concur in or object to a proposed par 
value, and it could object to the termination of a par value. 
(iv) A member would have to seek the reaction of the IMF before estab-
lishing a par value and would have to give notice before terminating a par 
value, but the IMF could find that a par value had ceased to exist even in 
the absence of notice. 
(v) The IMF would react to a proposal to establish a par value by a deci-
sion taken with a majority of the votes cast, but eighty-five percent of the 
total voting power would be necessary for a decision by the IMF to object 
to an intention to terminate a par value. 
Present IMF Law 
The law of the IMF that governs exchange rates at the present time is 
fundamentally different from the original law or the provisions governing 
the possible future par value system, even though the principle that ex-
change rates are matters of international concern has not been forsaken. 
The balance of authority over exchange rates between the IMF and mem-
bers that prevailed in the past has been altered and now tilts strongly to-
ward members.14 
Formerly, only one exchange arrangement was in full accord with the 
law and spirit of the Articles: a par value accepted by the IMF. A member 
is free now to choose its exchange arrangement, with only one exception. A 
member may not maintain the value of its currency in terms of gold, be-
cause a gradual reduction in the role of gold in the international monetary 
system is one of the objectives of the Second Amendment. Furthermore, a 
member, having chosen its exchange arrangement, may determine the value 
of its currency in relation to other currencies by action or may permit the 
value to develop by inaction. A member is not required, as a condition of 
14. For the present provisions on exchange arrangements, see Article IV, Second Amend-
ment to the Articles of Agreement of International Monetary Fund, entered into farce Apr. 1, 
1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8973. 
1542 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:1533 
selecting its exchange arrangement or of determining the external value of 
its currency, to seek the concurrence of the IMF. 
This freedom for members has produced a casserole of exchange ar-
rangements composed of ingredients so numerous and so varied that classi-
fication of them by the IMF requires eleven columns, garnished with eleven 
footnotes for deviations and nuances. To give some impression of this com-
plexity, it is sufficient to tabulate the headings and subheadings of this 
classification: 
Pegged 
U.S. dollar; French franc; other currency; SDR; other composite 
Flexibility Limited vis-a-vis a Single Currency or Group of Currencies 
Single currency; cooperative arrangements 
More flexible 
Adjusted according to a set of indicators; other managed floating; indepen-
dently floating 
The United States, as the main advocate of the freedom described 
above, argued that the stability of exchange rates had become a fetish that 
had contributed to the breakdown of the par value system. Members 
should be free to choose their domestic policies without the constraint im-
posed by an obligation to maintain an external value for their currencies. If 
members pursued policies to bring about orderly underlying conditions, the 
result would be a stable system of exchange rates, although not necessarily 
stable rates, because rates should be permitted to respond suitably to chang-
ing conditions. 
Members had to be subject to some obligations, notwithstanding the 
broad freedom assured to them, or else freedom would become license. To 
achieve the new goal of a stable system, the Articles impose some obliga-
tions on the way members behave in applying their chosen exchange ar-
rangement, although the obligations lac)c precision. 
Each member is subject to a general obligation to collaborate with the 
IMF and other members "to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to 
promote a stable system of exchange arrangements." 15 Four obligations of 
a more specific character provide some content for this general obligation. 
Two of the more specific obligations are more hortatory than peremptory. 
They have been drafted in this way because they are not confined to mem-
bers' external policies. The other two obligations relate to external policies 
only, for which reason it was more difficult to resist sharper language. No 
one of the general or more specific obligations is formulated in language 
that ~akes nonobservance apparent without a decision of the IMF. Noth-
ing in a member's behavior now would be comparable to the obvious fail-
ure of a member to maintain an effective par value in the days of the par 
value system. 
The five obligations are not limited to current conditions. The obliga-
tions will have to be observed at all times and would apply if the IMF were 
to make the recommendations referred to below or were to call the revised 
par value system into being. 
15. Article IV, Section 1, Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, entered into farce Apr. 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8973. 
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The IMF is required to monitor the international monetary system, in 
order to ensure its effective operation, and also the compliance of each 
member with its obligations of behavior. To fulfill these functions, the IMF 
must exercise "firm surveillance" over the exchange rate policies of mem-
bers. For this purpose, the IMF is directed to adopt "specific principles for 
the guidance of all members with respect to those policies," but the princi-
ples must not interfere with the freedom of members to choose their ex-
change arrangements. The IMF consults with members on their exchange 
rate policies. A member's failure to observe a specific principle of guidance 
would not be considered in itself a breach of obligation. The IMF would 
have to take account of this failure, but of all other relevant circumstances 
as well, in deciding whether a member was failing to perform an obligation. 
Decisions of the IMF in the exercise of its powers of surveillance are taken 
with a majority of the votes cast. 
The IMF's duty to oversee the international monetary system must be 
distinguished from the function of helping the system to develop. In ac-
cordance with this function, the IMF "may make provision for general ex-
change arrangements." This language means no more than that the IMF 
may recommend a particular kind of exchange arrangement to the mem-
bership at large. An implication of the provision is that the recommended 
exchange arrangement is already in widespread use. The IMF cannot im-
pose an obligation on members to apply the exchange arrangement, be-
cause the Articles declare that members retain their freedom of choice even 
after the IMF makes a recommendation. Nevertheless, a recommendation 
would have moral weight, and because it would exert this pressure, a ma-
jority of eighty-five percent of the total voting power has been made neces-
sary for a decision to present recommendations to members. 
Under the law now in force under the Articles, the five variables can be 
summarized as follows: 
(i) A member is not required to have a fixed exchange rate for its cur-
rency, but a member may peg its currency to any denominator of its choice 
except gold. 
(ii) A member is authorized not only to choose its exchange arrangement 
but also to establish and manage the exchange rate for its currency or to 
refrain from doing so by allowing the rate to float. 
(iii) The IMF is not authorized to concur in or object to a member's choice 
of exchange arrangement. 
(iv) The IMF can decide that a member's behavior in applying its ex-
change arrangement is not in accordance with its obligations as stated in 
the Articles or with the IMF's specific principles of guidance as declared 
from time to time. , 
(v) The decisions in (iv) above are taken with a majority of the votes cast. 
Central Rates and Target Zones 
For a few years after the breakdown of the par value system, there was a 
common assumption that agreement would be reached on the restoration of 
such a system, although with improvements. In that period, the IMF 
adopted what was described as a temporary regime of central rates and 
wider margins. The rules of the regime were a stopgap device that could 
not validate exchange rates under the unamended Articles, but were 
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designed to minimize disorder at a time when the par value system was 
ineffective. Members were told that if they acted in accordance with the 
rules of the temporary regime, they would be deemed to be collaborating 
with the IMF in current conditions, although conformity with these rules 
would not be considered the exclusive mode of collaboration. 16 
The essence of the first decision on central rates was that a member 
would be deemed to be collaborating with the IMF if the member main-
tained a stable rate for its currency as the basis for exchange transactions in 
its territory. A rate was "stable" if it was based on a central rate expressed 
directly or indirectly in terms of gold. An initial or subsequent central rate 
communicated to the IMF took effect under the decision unless the IMF 
found the rate unsatisfactory. A central rate had the virtue that, because it 
was not recognized as a par value, the procedures under the Articles and 
under a member's domestic law for the establishment of a par value did not 
have to be followed for the establishment of a central rate, and the IMF did 
not have to concur in the rate, although the IMF reserved the right to find 
that a communicated rate was unsatisfactory. 
The second decision on central rates did not require the direct or indi-
rect expression of a central rate in terms of gold. It was sufficient if the 
currency was stable in terms of another currency, even if that other cur-
rency was not itself maintained as a stable currency in the sense of the first 
decision and floated independently. 
For members with currencies that were floating independently, which 
were defined as currencies that were not pegged within relatively narrow 
margins to another currency or composite of currencies, the IMF adopted a 
decision on June 13, 1974, entitled Guidelines for the Management of 
Floating Exchange Rates. 17 The IMF recommended that if a currency was 
floating independently, the issuer should use its best endeavors to observe 
the Guidelines, but the IMF did not purport to treat observance as obliga-
tory. Throughout its history, the IMF has been reluctant to prescribe spe-
cific obligations for members to collaborate. Guidelines have seemed to be 
preferable because they can be administered flexibly and because they can 
be modified by decisions as experience is gained or as conditions change. 
Practices that accorded with the Guidelines were not validated by them 
if they were not in conformity with the Articles. The Guidelines were no 
more capable of conferring validity under the unamended Articles than 
were the decisions on central rates and wider margins. Only observance of 
the provisions of the Articles on par values and exchange rates could confer 
legality on exchange rates before the Second Amendment. 
The first two of the six Guidelines of 1974 defined conduct that a mem-
ber should follow (i) to smooth out fluctuations in the exchange rate for the 
member's currency from day to day and from week to week and (ii) to 
moderate movements from month to month and from quarter to quarter. 
The third Guideline recognized that a member might wish to act otherwise 
than in accordance with the first two Guidelines in order to bring the ex-
change rate within, or closer to, some target zone of rates. 
16. SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 13-21 (8th issue 
1976). 
11. Id at 21-30. 
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A member disposed to establish a target zone was expected to consult 
the IMF about this zone and its adaptation to changing circumstances. If 
the IMF considered the zone to be within the range of reasonable estimates 
of the medium-term norm for the exchange rate, the member would be free 
to move its exchange rate toward the zone, subject to certain reservations, 
even if this action was not in accordance with the first two Guidelines. The 
concept of the norm was that of an exchange rate that would tend to bring 
about equilibrium in the balance of payments as defined. The medium-term 
was expressed, with evident hesitancy, to be a period of about four years. 
If a member had a medium-term norm for its currency, and if the IMF 
concluded that the exchange rate had moved outside the range of reason-
able estimates for the norm to an extent that was likely to be harmful to the 
interests of members, the IMF could take the initiative to approach the 
member. The IMF could make recommendations, but only after the Man-
aging Director had consulted the member. The IMF was to observe re-
straint in all cases, but particularly if there was great uncertainty regarding 
the balance of payments situation and prospects of a member. 
The Guidelines were abrogated as a result of the Second Amendment of 
the Articles. The IMF is now required to adopt specific principles for the 
guidance of "all members." The reference to all members reflects the free-
dom that members have to choose their exchange arrangements, the policy 
of avoiding any legal or moral implication that pegging is preferable to 
floating, and dissatisfaction with the concentration of the Guidelines on 
members with unpegged currencies. 
The performance of exchange rates in present conditions has been the 
subject of much criticism. Target zones, in concept at least, offer an obvious 
halfway house between the fixity of a par value system and the permissive-
ness of the current law. It is not surprising, therefore, that some economists 
are now recommending target zones, with some role for the IMF, although 
there is also much resistance to the suggestion of target zones. 18 
If there were to be enough official sympathy for target zones, the IMF 
could act in support of them and could have a role in their administration 
under a variety of powers in the present Articles. The IMF could rely on 
the obligation of members to collaborate, the power to adopt specific princi-
ples of guidance, or the power to recommend general exchange 
arrangements. 19 
The Guidelines of 1974 dealt with the five variables in the following 
manner: 
(i) A target zone was a compromise between fixed and floating exchange 
rates. 
18. For the opposing views of two ex-U.S. Treasury officials, compare Roosa, Intervention 
Methods Can .Define Target Zones, J. of Com., June 3, 1983, at 4A, col. 2, with Widman, 
Exchange Rate Targeting Will Not Work, J. of Com., Dec. 16, 1982, at 4A, col. 2; see also J. 
WILLIAMSON, THE EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEM (1983). These authors do not discuss the 1974 
Guidelines on target zones or the reasons for the failure of the idea as embodied in the 
Guidelines. 
19. Another technique would be available but would be less appealing. The IMF could 
call the par value system into operation and establish wide limits around parities. The Articles 
provide already for limits as broad as 4 ½ percent, but the IMF could establish other limits by 
decisions taken with 85 percent of the total voting power. 
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(ii) A member, and not the IMF, could take the initiative to establish a 
target zone. 
(iii) A member that decided to establish a target zone was to consult the 
IMF on it. The IMF, it seemed, could endorse or oppose the target zone 
the member was choosing. It was also implied that if the IMF opposed the 
choice, the member would be acting inappropriately, although not neces-
sarily illegally, by departing from those Guidelines that could be neglected 
if the IMF had endorsed the member's target zone. 
(iv) It was implied that the IMF should have the opportunity to react 
before a target zone was established, although reaction after the event was 
not precluded. 
(v) All decisions of the IMF under the Guidelines would be taken with a 
majority of the votes cast. 
European Monetary System 
The fluctuation of exchange rates, particularly for the U.S. dollar, has 
led to an important development in the regulation of exchange rates. The 
European Community (EC) concluded that the instability of exchange rates 
was prejudicial to its objectives. The European Council, after meeting in 
Bremen, issued a communique on July 7, 1978, announcing the intention to 
create the European Monetary System (EMS) in the hope of establishing "a 
zone of monetary stability" in Europe. A Resolution of the Council on 
December 5, 1978, established the structure of the EMS and an Agreement 
of March 13, 1979, among the Central Banks of the EC set forth the operat-
ing procedures.20 The EMS is more than an attempt to bring order into 
exchange arrangements in the EC; the EMS is intended to promote the inte-
gration of the EC. The exchange rate arrangements of the EMS can be 
considered a regional par value system based upon a common denominator 
of its own, the European Currency Unit (ECU), which is also a monetary 
asset and has even further functions in the EMS and in other activities of 
the EC. The EMS began to operate on March 13, 1979. 
The ECU is a basket of defined amounts of the currencies of EC mem-
bers, except the Greek drachma, which will be included in the basket not 
later than the end of 1985. The amounts of currencies in the basket can be 
revised in certain circumstances. Revisions, which are to be made in line 
with underlying economic criteria, have to be mutually accepted, which 
suggests that the agreement is necessary of all the issuers of currencies in 
the basket. The original basket has not been changed so far (the end of 
1983). 
Members of the EC may elect to participate in the exchange arrange-
ments of the EMS. All members have become participants, except the 
United Kingdom and Greece, which may participate later. Each partici-
pant establishes a central rate for its currency in terms of the ECU. Initial 
central rates were established by agreeement. The central rates among par-
ties to the narrow margins arrangement ("the snake"), which preceded the 
20. TEXTS CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM (1979) and 12 EUR. ECON. 
(July 1982) include the constitutive documents of the EMS. 
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EMS,21 correspond to the central rates established under that arrangement. 
The central rates of the currencies of other participants in the exchange 
arrangements of the EMS were based on prevailing exchange rates, with 
necessary adjustments, between the currencies of these participants and the 
currencies of parties to "the snake." 
Adjustments in central rates are subject to "mutual agreement by a com-
mon procedure which will comprise all countries participating in the ex-
change rate mechanism and the Commission."22 It is not clear from this 
language whether changes can be made only by unanimous agreement 
among the participants and the Commission of the EC, but adjustments 
seem to have been made with common consent before the changes were put 
into effect. Common consent is feasible among so small a number of par-
ticipants, even if hard bargaining precedes common consent. No provision 
is made for weighted voting power. It would be without legal impact on 
decisions for which unanimity was required. The justification for common 
consent is the obvious one of the economic consequences of a change in 
central rate for partners in so close an undertaking as the EMS. Opposing 
views have been expressed by expert commentators on whether a partici-
pant violates Community law by changing a central rate notwithstanding 
the absence of agreement in the common procedure.23 
The need for common consent is understandable for the further reason 
that an adjustment of the central rate for a participant's currency modifies 
the central rate for the currency of all other participants in an opposite di-
rection. An adjustment produces this consequence because the number of 
units of a participant's currency in the ECU is fixed and the value of them, 
therefore, is affected by the adjustment. The values in relation to the ECU 
of all other currencies that compose the ECU change as a result of the 
change in value of a component currency. 
An unusual feature of the procedure for common consent is that the 
amount of change in a central rate appears to be the subject of negotiation 
and counter-proposals.24 This practice differs from the procedure for 
changes in par values under the former par value system of the IMF. A 
member proposed a change, but the IMF was not authorized to negotiate a 
different change. The word "concur" instead of "agree" to describe a possi-
ble reaction of the IMF was carefully chosen to emphasize the member's 
authority over its currency and to create a presumption in favor of the 
IMF's acceptance of a proposal. The IMF, it is true, could object to the 
amount of a proposed change as inadequate or excessive, but it was then 
the member's privilege to make a new proposal if it wished. The IMF could 
21. For differences between the EMS and the snake, see J. GOLD, SDRs, CURRENCIES, 
AND GOLD: FOURTH SURVEY OF NEW LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 63-64 (1980). 
22. TEXTS CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM, supra note 20, at 44-45. 
23. Smits, Some Aspects efthe Monetary Law of the European Community, JuRIDICA n.120 
(1984) (forthcoming). There is no express concept in the EMS that resembles the unauthorized 
change of par value under the original Articles of the IMF. 
24. The first multilateral negotiation of changes made in exchange rates appears to have 
been the one, engaged in by ten of the main industrialized members of the IMF, that led to the 
Smithsonian agreement of December 18, 1971. 
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not decide that the member had to make a new proposal or what that pro-
posal had to be. 
A bilateral relationship arises between each pair of currencies as a con-
sequence of central rates under EMS arrangements. Participants must ob-
serve limits of 2.25 percent above and below the bilateral relationship 
between the currencies involved in spot exchange transactions. When a 
currency reaches the upper or lower limit against another currency, the cen-
tral bank of each of the two participants must intervene in the exchange 
market in the currency of the other participant. Italy avails itself of the 
privilege of limits of six percent, but they are to be gradually reduced as 
economic conditions permit. 
A "divergence indicator" has been defined that gives a signal if the ex-
change rate of a currency is moving out of line with the average exchange 
rates of all other currencies. If a participant's currency crosses its "thresh-
old of divergence," a presumption arises that the participant will correct the 
situation by adequate measures, which may include a change in central 
rate, but the choice of measures is left to the participant. If, "on account of 
special circumstances," measures are not taken, an explanation must be 
given to the other participants. 
European countries outside the EC with particularly close economic and 
financial ties with the EC may join in the exchange arrangements of the 
EMS. Agreements would have to be reached for this purpose among all the 
central banks involved. No agreements had been reached by the end of 
1983. The EC has declared that the EMS is, and will remain, fully compati-
ble with the relevant provisions of the IMF's Articles. 
The five variable elements have been incorporated in the EMS in the 
following manner: 
(i) A participant must establish a fixed central rate for its currency in 
terms of the ECU. 
(ii) A participant can take the initiative to change the central rate for its 
currency. 
(iii) The other participants and the EC Commission must react to a pro-
posed change in central rate. 
(iv) A participant must seek this reaction before making a change. 
(v) It seems that the unanimous agreement of the other participants and 
the Commission is necessary. 
The EMS is not the only regional agreement among countries by which 
they accept some de jure or de facto limitation on their freedom to deter-
mine exchange rates. The arrangements vary greatly in their complexity, 
the degree of limitation they apply, and their objectives. Monetary unions 
and monetary zones are among the arrangements.25 
Imposed Exchange Rates 
In all the models considered above, the issuer of a currency retains legal 
authority, although in different degrees, to determine the exchange rate of 
its currency. In other models, the exchange rate of a currency may be im-
25. Collyns,Altematives to the Central Bank in the Developing World, in IMF OCCASIONAL 
PAPER 29 {1983). 
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posed by an external entity. It is astonishing to recall that H.D. While, the 
main official in the United States behind the plan for a Stabilization Fund 
in the early forties, thought that the organization should establish the rate 
of exchange for a member's currency at which the organization would con-
duct transactions with the member.26 He recognized that the Stabilization 
Fund's action might have the effect of determining the exchange rate for 
exchange transactions even when the Fund was not a party to them.27 The 
idea did not prevail, except as noted below, even though the United States 
had greater influence in the negotiation of the original Articles than any 
other country. _ 
Two provisions of the original Articles did confer authority on an exter-
nal entity to affect the exchange rate of a currency. The IMF could decide, 
on its own initiative and by a majority of the total voting power (in contrast 
to a majority of the votes cast), to make uniform proportionate changes in 
the par values of all currencies, provided that such a change was approved 
by every member that had ten percent of the total quotas. The proviso was 
intended to be a discreet formula for vetoes that the United States and the 
United Kingdom would be able to exercise. The objective of the provision 
was to permit the IMF to expand or contract international liquidity by de-
valuing or revaluing all currencies, or, in other words, to increase or de-
crease the price of gold in currency, because gold was the common 
denominator of the par value system.28 
A uniform proportionate change in the par values of all currencies 
would not have affected the parities between currencies. Nevertheless, to 
respect the authority of members over their currencies, the Articles permit-
ted a member that acted promptly to prevent the change from applying to 
its own currency. If a member exercised this option, it would be revaluing 
its currency against the currencies of members that were accepting the effect 
of a uniform proportionate devaluation, or devaluing its currency against 
the currencies of members that were accepting the effect of a uniform pro-
portionate revaluation. In either of these circumstances, the decision of the 
IMF would have brought about, in a certain sense, a change in the parities 
between the currencies of the member that took itself out of the decision 
and other currencies. The IMF never took a decision to make a uniform 
proportionate change in the par values of all currencies. 
The other provision on exchange rates imposed by an external entity 
related to the separate currencies of a member's dependencies. A member 
26. See 3 J. HORSEFIELD, supra note 3, at 42, 60 & 89. 
27. "[T)he authority to set the rates of exchange at which the Fund is willing to operate can 
be an important and in some cases a decisive influence on the rate at which transactions are 
made outside of the Fund." 3 J. Horsefield, supra note 3, at 60. 
28. Article IV, Section 7, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 
openedforsignature July 22, 1944, 20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39. In the 
First Amendment, the provision was modified by substituting the majority of 85 percent of 
total voting power and abrogating the proviso (the effect of which was to deprive the United 
Kingdom of its former veto). The Second Amendment substitutes the majority of 70 percent 
of the total voting power. See Schedule C, paragraph 11, Second Amendment to the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, entered into force Apr. 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 
2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937. The provision relates not to the control of liquidity, but to the neces-
sity to adapt the SOR basket in certain circumstances if the par value system of Schedule C is 
in force and the SDR is the common denominator. 
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had to undertake that the Articles would be observed in respect of all its 
dependent territories, whatever their status might be in constitutional or 
international law. Dependent territories could not, and cannot now, become 
members. They may have their own currencies, however, called "separate 
currencies" by the Articles, and some of these currencies may be important 
in international payments. Under the par value system, a member was re-
sponsible to the IMF for establishing, and had the privilege of changing, the 
par values of separate currencies in accordance with the procedures of the 
Articles. A member's consitutional or political arrangements might have 
conceded actual authority to the government of a dependency over the ex-
change rate of its currency, but these arrangements did not affect the rela-
tionship between the member and the IMF or the member's responsibility 
as described above.29 
Legal Effectiveness 
The effectiveness of a system for the international regulation of ex-
change rates may be judged by reference to the purposes of the system, 
which are likely to be economic. That judgment can be left to economists. 
They will not agree among themselves. Effectiveness can be judged accord-
ing to another criterion. It is more objective and within the province of 
international law. To what extent have the legal prescriptions of a system 
been observed? This inquiry can go beyond compliance and encompass the 
question of the extent to which countries have undertaken to observe the 
prescriptions. The distinction between economic and legal effectiveness is 
not complete. Legal effectiveness connotes economic effectiveness because 
it can be assumed that if a system does not satisfy economic aspirations, 
governments may decide not to observe the legal prescriptions of the system 
or to withdraw from it. 
By August 15, 1971, 118 countries had become members of the IMF. 
The major countries that had not become members were the U.S.S.R., 
which had attended the Bretton Woods Conference, and Switzerland, 
which had not. Swiss representatives have frequently asserted that they are 
more punctilious in conforming to the underlying principles of the Bretton 
Woods system than some members, notwithstanding the absence of an un-
dertaking. Over the course of time, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Indonesia, and 
Poland withdrew from the IMF, but Indonesia reentered with little delay. 
Only the case of Czechoslovakia involved issues related to the provisions on 
par values. 
In the period 1945 to 1955, various members that had established par 
values floated their currencies in violation of their obligations. Other mem-
bers had not established par values, or were applying multiple currency 
practices that made their par values wholly or largely meaningless, or were 
applying restrictions on payments and transfers for current international 
transactions as measures in support of their par values. An established par 
29. See Article IV, Section 9, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 
opened far signature July 22, 1944, 20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39. For the 
somewhat similar provision of the present Articles, see Article V, Section 5, Second Agreement 
to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, entered into farce Apr. 1, 
1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937. 
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value, therefore, did not mean that a member had achieved an exchange 
system that was the ideal of the Articles. 
On March 15, 1971, when the IMF issued its last Schedule of Par Val-
ues, 26 of the 117 members at that time had not yet established par values 
and 8 that had done so were failing in their obligations to make their par 
values effective. The 26 members were not in violation because the IMF 
had not called on them to establish initial par values. The IMF recognized 
that the economic circumstances of these members would have prevented 
them from maintaining effective par values. The IMF's restraint demon-
strated that par values were not the optimal exchange arrangement for all 
members at all times. The IMF encouraged some members that had estab-
lished par values but were in difficulties to float their currencies as a transi-
tion to new and effective par values. All but one of the 34 members were 
developing countries. It must not be thought that the exchange systems of 
all the other 83 members were free from multiple currency practices or re-
strictions on payments and transfers. 
Too gloomy a deduction must not be drawn from these statistics. With 
the exception of Canada for lengthy periods, and the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Netherlands for brief periods, developed members main-
tained effective par values. It follows that the world's trade and payments 
were conducted in large part on the basis of effective par values. On August 
15, 1971, the floating of the dollar in violation of the obligations of the 
United States under the Articles brought the par value system of the Arti-
cles to a violent end. 
After the breakdown, many members availed themselves of the IMF's 
decisions on central rates and wider margins for a time. The United States 
never declared a central rate and devalued the dollar twice, but took no 
action to make the par value effective. It was left to other members that 
wished to maintain a fixed relationship to the dollar, either on the basis of a 
par value or a central rate, to take the measures necessary for this purpose. 
The United Kingdom decided to allow sterling to float independently in 
June 1972, and Japan took the same step for the yen in February 1973. The 
Canadian dollar floated at all times; the floating of the Italian lira began on 
February 13, 1973. A number of members of the EC maintained narrow 
margins based on central rates for transactions involving their own curren-
cies, and wider margins in relation to the dollar ("the snake in the tunnel"), 
but in March 1973 abandoned these latter margins. The French franc was 
allowed to float in January 1974. 
The experience of the past was being reversed: the currencies of major 
industrialized countries were floating while many developing countries 
sought to peg their currencies in some way. The floating of major curren-
cies was one of the main reasons why the Guidelines on the Management of 
Floating Exchange Rates were adopted. The decision was never more than 
a gesture. No member declared a target zone. The members that had float-
ing currencies resented the stricter surveillance that was to be exercised over 
them as compared with members that pegged their currencies. This lesson 
in resistance to asymmetry explains why the Second Amendment refers to 
the IMF's duty to adopt specific principles for the guidance of "all mem-
bers" with respect to their exchange rate policies. 
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Nothing has been published that suggests a finding by the IMF of a 
violation of the present provisions of the Articles on exchange arrange-
ments or of the nonobservance by a member of the IMF's specific princi-
ples. As noted already, the corollary of the imprecision of the present law is 
that the inconsistency of a member's behavior with the Articles or with the 
specific principles cannot be determined without a decision of the IMF. The 
absence of a decision need not imply consistency because of the IMF's 
traditional preference for quiet persuasion and its reluctance to adopt cen-
sorious decisions. 
The discipline that an international organization can exert is stronger if 
the organization's authority is exercised before a member initiates policies. 
If the organization can act only after policies are in place, discipline is 
weaker because members are more willing to run the risk of formal disap-
probation. They know that this reaction is unlikely and that a finding of 
violation is even more unlikely. 
U.S. negotiators hoped that the IMF's jurisdiction over exchange rate 
policies would become firmer notwithstanding the imprecision of the rele-
vant provisions of the Second Amendment. As the IMF accumulated expe-
rience in performing its function of firm surveillance, an expanding code of 
specific principles would be formulated. U.S. negotiators cited the example 
of case-law in common law systems. This analogy has proved to be inappo-
site: the three specific principles announced originally by the IMF, in lan-
guage as imprecise as the Articles, have not been sharpened or augmented. 
Experience has resulted in a progressive elaboration of the procedures for 
surveillance but not of the specific principles.30 
No participant in the exchange arrangements of the EMS has with-
drawn from them, although from time to time the newspapers have re-
ported that a member was considering withdrawal. In this respect, the EMS 
has been more effective than "the snake," in which participation shrank 
from time to time. Although no participant has withdrawn from the ex-
change arrangements of the EMS, their effectiveness has been diminished 
by the decision of the United Kingdom not to participate in them. 
All changes in central rates have been made in accordance with the legal 
provisions governing the EMS, although there has been some criticism that 
the number and increasing frequency of changes are evidence that a zone of 
stability has not been achieved. The reply is made that the EMS should be 
considered a system of neither fixed nor floating exchange rates but a sys-
tem of jointly managed rates. 
Some General Reflections 
I. The models for the international regulation of exchange rates that 
have been or are in force demonstrate that, for the last four decades, gov-
ernments have accepted the principle that exchange rates are properly mat-
ters of international concern. Governments have given practical expression 
to this concern by subjecting exchange rates to international agreement or 
at least to international scrutiny. The right to initiate changes in exchange 
30. For a more detailed account of the present position, see Gold, Strengthening the Soft 
International Law of Exchange Arrangements, 77 AM. J. INTL. L. 443 (1983). 
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rates has been among the retained powers. The IMF's former authority to 
decide on a uniform proportionate change in the par values of the curren-
cies of all members had no practical importance. 
2. The unwillingness of governments to concede the power of initiative 
to international organizations is matched by the unwillingness of govern-
ments to accept dictation by formula. In the discussions of reform in the 
Committee of 20, U.S. representatives proposed "objective indicators" in 
the shape of staggered changes in the level of a member's monetary 
reserves. These developments would have created an obligation or at least a 
strong presumption that a member should take steps, including possibly a 
change in exchange rate, to adjust the balance of payments. The U.S. rep-
resentatives argued that governments and the public would prefer the 
mechanism of objective indicators, and graduated pressures based on them, 
rather than the exercise of discretion by an international organization. The 
assumption about the preference of other governments proved to be wrong: 
the U.S. ideas received little support and much opposition. The exercise of 
discretion by the IMF was preferred because a government would have the 
opportunity to persuade the IMF that the government's action or inaction 
was justifiable.31 
The divergence indicator of the EMS is an objective indicator, but one 
that relies on a formula based on the behavior of exchange rates and not 
changes in monetary reserves. The indicator is a remarkable development, 
even if it creates no more than a presumption of the need to take action, 
and even if the indicator was invented as a compromise between opposing 
groups in the negotiation of a crucial feature of the exchange arrangements 
of the EMS. 
3. A study confined to the legal provisions of any system for the regu-
lation of exchange rates will not provide a true impression of the system. 
The life of a system depends on the administration of it once the negotiators 
have finished their task. To understand the par value system, for example, 
it must be realized that the administration of the legal provisions was af-
fected by two tendencies, which may seem to have been contradictory but 
which were not difficult to reconcile. The international staff tended to con-
clude that all aspects of exchange were subject to the scrutiny of the IMF. 
The Executive Board was not disposed to limit the jurisdiction of the IMF 
in matters relating to exchange rates, but, in applying the law, tended to 
give the benefit of any doubt to a member. It is possible that these two 
tendencies will be present in any system administered by an organization 
that includes within its structure a permanent staff and an executive organ 
composed of persons appointed or elected by member governments. 
4. The coexistence of a variety of international arrangements for the 
regulation of exchange rates can pose a problem of reconciliation when a 
country belongs to more than one of these arrangements. The EC was 
aware of this problem when it declared that the EMS is and will remain 
fully compatible with the relevant provisions of the IMF's Articles. The 
"snake" was a cooperative arrangement among some members of the EC 
that was in existence when the Second Amendment was negotiated. Some 
31. See Developments in the International Monetary System, supra note 5, at 193-201. 
1554 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:1533 
of the countries that belonged to both the EC and the IMF negotiated ex-
press mention of cooperative arrangements among the arrangements that 
members can maintain consistently with their freedom of choice, even 
though this mention is redundant. Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine 
that problems of reconciliation might arise in the operation of the EMS and 
the IMF. 
An example can be cited of a problem of reconciling the EMS, not with 
a multilateral organization such as the IMF, but with so intimate a bilateral 
arrangement as the Economic Union of Belgium and Luxembourg (BLEU). 
When the central rate of the Belgian franc in the EMS was reduced on 
February 22, 1982, the Luxembourg authorities, whose franc is legally the 
equivalent of the Belgian franc, are said to have complained that they were 
not consulted in advance. This situation hastened parliamentary approval 
in Luxembourg of the statute of May 20, 1983, authorizing the creation of a 
central monetary institution for that country with power to break the equiv-
alence between the two currencies. 
Membership in the IMF has been open to countries that belong to a 
monetary union. The IMF recognizes only the individual membership of 
states. It has been necessary, therefore, for the IMF to conclude that each 
member of a monetary union will be able to perform its obligations under 
the Articles notwithstanding the close association that members of the 
union must maintain in matters relating to their common currency. 
5. A lesson of monetary history is that exchange arrangements are not 
permanent. There may be an alternation between fixed and floating sys-
tems. When the present system of free choice was introduced, the way in 
which it would behave was not foreseen. The economics of floating is being 
learned slowly. The dissatisfaction with which many monetary authorities 
view present multilateral arrangements has not yet led to a widely accepta-
ble alternative. 
To arrive at such an alternative would be an immense task. Power is 
distributed in the present world. The United States cannot exercise the 
overwhelming influence that it enjoyed in the years when its leadership pro-
duced the original Articles of the IMF. If its positive power is now less, its 
negative power is still enormous. That is to say, if the United States does 
not lead, it cannot be made to move, and its movement is necessary for 
change. 
If the international community were to arrive at agreement on an alter-
native to the present system, the Articles as now written would provide am-
ple accommodation for change however sharp it might be. It is probably 
important to realize that the Articles would permit measured evolution. 
The IMF could adopt specific principles for the guidance of all members 
with respect to their exchange arrangements, and the IMF could give con-
tent to the obligation of members to collaborate with the IMF and other 
members to bring about orderly arrangements and to promote a stable sys-
tem of exchange rates. All these possibilities exist even if it never becomes 
feasible to call into operation the flexible par value system included in the 
Articles. 
